To devise and use a program for retraining IRR UFI-l aviators and to determine the training required in relation to total military flight hours and time away from flying.
Procedure:
Twenty-four aviators in four successive groups were retrained and evaluated at USAAVNC over the course of one year. Although the training program was improved between groups, the in-flight evaluation procedure remained the same.
Data from 17 of the aviators were used as a basis for the findings.
Findings:
An average of just over 13 hours of flight training time was required to bring the aviators to criterion, this figure correlating negatively with total flight hours and positively with years away from flying.
Utilization of Findings:
The POI developed in this experiment is currently being used in all Army units where IRR aviators are being trained. The findings on required flying hours are being used in the determination of optimum tour lengths. The research reported in this document was performed as part of a project on "Army Aviator Skill Maintenance, Loss and Recovery," sponsored by the Director of Army Training, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DAT-DCSOPS) Individual Reserve aviators, who had been away from military flying for a number of years, were attached to active Army units for brief training periods in order to prepare them as valuable mobilization assets.
In order to maximize the cost-effectiveness of this program, DA needed a rapid response to the question of the extent to which the flying skills of these aviators had deteriorated. They also needed to know the nature and amount of training necessary to correct this deficiency, and then to maintain the Rescrvist's skill at a satisfactory level. At the same time, the Army Research Institute (ARI) Field Unit at Fort Rucker, had been tasked by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS) under Human Recources Need (HRN) 80-4, to investigate this problem for Active Army aviators who were returning to flying status after one or more non-flying assignments.
Consequently, in July 1979, DCSOPS, Forces Command (FORSCOM), the Reserve Component Personnel and Administrative Center (RCPAC) and ARI agreed that ARI's effort should be concentrated initially in one area, specifically the IRR Program.
Information relevant to this retraining paradigm was sought from four sources:
the literature, other Services, the Active Army, and the Reserve. There tre relevant studies in the literature which give general guidance about retraining strategy, but none are helpful in determining how much retraining is required, or exactly how total flight hours or years away from flying would affect this figure.
Thus, in an extensive review of the literature, Prophet (1976) concluded that basic flight control skills (motor) are retained well over extended periods of non-flying, while instrument and procedural skills are retained less well.
He notes that, "the extent and manner of degradation of tactical flight skills and higher order flight skills are largely unknown." Schendel, et al (1978) , in a general review of retention of motor skills, confirm that procedural skills are lost quickly, whereas continuous control tasks hold up much better. They also observe that, "the single most important determinant of motor retention is the level of original learning." This latter finding is confirmed by Naylor and Briggs (1961) and Gardlin and Sitterly (1978) .
Many other factor", such as the length of the no-practice period, the type of tasks and the nature of intervening activities may influence retention.
The experience of the other Services is not particularly germane to the IRR situation, as the Air Force and Navy often retrain their returning aviators onto a new aircraft type, thereby confounding old and new learning. However, a study of returning Vietnam POWs indicated that retraining time on aircraft which they had previously flown should be fairly short, particularly for those with high experience levels (Smith and Matheny, 1976) .
In a review of the literature on cognitive pre-training and the maintenance of flying skills, Smith (1980) reports that the Air Force currently has two major research i.rograms in this area.
One, being conducted at the US Air Force Academy, Colorado, F is concentrated on the maintenance of flying skills during non-flying assi.nments; whereas the other, at the Human Resources Laboratory at Williams AFB, i:; concentrated on reacquisition training following the loss of these skills. Both studies may well provide much useful information when they are completed in the 1982-83 tlmeframe.
The primary objective of the refresher course conducted at USAAVNC for tl Active Ara.y is renewal of instrument qualification; most aviators achieving this in the 18 hours in-flight and 12 hours simulator time that is allowed. However, the primary concern in the IRR situation is contact flying, and any extrapolation from instrument to contact flying must be made with much care. Lastly, although 28 IRR aviators participated in the program in FY 78, and 35C were scheduled for FY 79, they were not subjected to a common training and assessment program.
Individual experience varied greatly and the only information to be derived from their training was informal feedback to RCPAC.
Although data from other sources suggested that retraining should be accomplished fairly easily, gave some guidance as to which skills were likely to deteriorate most (more complex, procedural ones) and emphasized that original level of learning was probably a critical variable, many questions about the amount and manner of retraining remained unanswered.
Thus, it was decided to attack the problem in two ways:
to survey the IRR aviators who were training with active Army units to see how much training they required (this work i reported separately, Allnutt, 1980) , and to train a group of aviators at Fort Rucker and use them as a test-bed for developing training and assessment procedures.
A description of this activity forms the substance of this report.
A fundamental decision that had to be taken before the amount of training required could be investigated was the criterion for successful retraining. FORSCOM decided that, solely for the purposes of this investigation, they wool deem an aviator retrained when he could pass an Annual Aviator Proficiency and Readiness Test (AAPART) checkride, excluding tactical and instrument proficien They gave the training priority as: day contact flight and then, if time permitted, night, Nap-of-the-Earth (NOE), tactical instruments and full instru ments.
Having established the criterion, the objective was to find out how much training the IRR aviator needed to reach this level, and how best to trail him.
The latter objective involved devising and developing a training program and assessment system with the aim of it being used in the future by all activi Army units which conduct training for IRR aviators.
Thus, a primary constraini on the training program and asssssment system was that they must be exportable and not based on facilities unique to ARI or Fort Rucker.
Limited resources and a very tight timeframe precluded the careful task analysis and development of a total program which would have been the optimum procedure.
Rather, the program was developed in a series of iterations. The first four subjects were treated as a pilot erorin and major changes to the program made at the end of their training.
Although improvements to the program were made throughout the rest of the experiment, they were considered to be sufficiently small Lu allow the remaining Reservists to be considered as on( group.
One part of the experiment is dealt with in a separate self-contained section.
This is an investigation of the possibility of converting U11-i aviators to the role of AH-i copilot/gunner. FORSCOM expressed serious concern about a major shortfall of AH-i copilot/gunners and tasked ARI with seeing how long it would take to convert a UH-I aviator to this position. A report of this work appears in Appendix 1.
OBJECTIVES
The three main objectives of this investigation were to:
(1) determine the amount of (re)training needed to bring an IRR aviator who had not flown for several years up to AAPART contact checkride standards, (2) establish the variables which affect this figure, and (3) devise and develop an exportable training and evaluation program to bring him to this level.
PILOT STUDY

Method
Four Reservists were posted to ARI shortly after the project was initiated. This group served as subjects in a p~lot study in which training and evaluation procedures were evolved.
The total military flight hours of the group averaged 1160 (range 750-1660) and they had not flown an aircraft for an average of 5 years (range 2-8 years).
The initial program was devised by a group of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) going through the task list extracted by FORSCOM from the Aircrew Training Manual (ATM) (Appendix C).
Financial constraints determined that a Reservist should not fly more than once a day.
In 12 training days, they flew 10.5 hours dual instruction in tl,! air (which included two checkrides), 6 hours in the UH-i simulator (SFTS) and studied for 36 hours in the classroom.
At the end of the period, they and their IPs were extensively debriefed.
Results
Two of the Reservists passed (70%) an AAPART contact checkride (excluding the oral) at the end of the training period.
Their performance on pre-and post-training academic tests had improved markedly, and they and their IPs had numerous suggestions as to how the program could be improved.
Discussion
The initial training and evaluation program had to be assembled very quickly and it was modified extensively both during and after the pilot study. Although the overall format proved to be fairly satisfactory, individual lessons were changed extensively, new ones added, and unnecessary ones eliminated.
METHOD Subjects
Twenty IRR aviators in successive groups of six, six, and eight acted as subjects for the main phase of the program.
Although the groups were trained some months apart, and some changes were made to the training program in the intervals, the in-flight evaluation procedure remained the same. Thus, with appropriate caveats as to the interpretation of the data, it was decided to treat these subjects as one group.
The total military flight hours of the 17 aviators on whom the data are based (see Results and Analysis Section, Para a) averaged 1292 (range 400-2500) hours, and their average time away from military flying was 6.0 (range 2-9) years.
One had previously been an IP and none had done any significant civilian flying.
They had been engaged in a variety of civilian occupations, only one of which was aviation related (civilian ATC).
The selection of the subjects by RCPAC was based largely on administrative factors; the only limitation imposed by ARI was that they had not done any significant civilian flying since leaving the military.
Tour lengths varied between 11 and 22 training days.
Evaluators
Pre-and post-training checkrides were conducted by Standardization Instructor Pilots (SIPs) 'rom the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization (DES) at USAAVNC.
Whenever administratively possible, an aviator had the same SIP for both checkrides.
During the planning phase, the SIPs met with ARI staff to discuss the evaluation procedure.
Trainers
All flight and SFTS training, and the great majority of ground instruction, was conducted by five ARI IPs.
These IPs had an average of 1410 hours (range 50-2080) hours as IPs, and their total military flight experience averaged 3020 (range 1300-4500) hours.
Training was two on one, an IP teaching the same two students for the length of their training_period.
A very small part of the ground instruction was given by another member of ARI's staff.
Measures a.
Checkride.
At the start and end of training each Resuzviqt was given an AAPART contact checkride (which included the oral examination).
The Evaluator comp].tcd a standard gradeslip (DA Form 4507-R, I and 2) and gave the Reservist a percentage score for the ride (70% being the passing grade). If the Reservist failed the checkride, the Evaluator made a written estimate of the additional flight training hours which would be required before the Reservist would reach the 70% level.
During the initial checkride, the Reservist's future IP sat in the rear of the aircraft and filled in a diagnostic form (Appendix D) detailing performance deficiencies.
b
Training flights. The standard gradeslip was used for all training flights.
c. Academic tests.
On the first and tenth (seventeenth for 5 Subjects see Resu s Section, Para k) day of training, each Reservist completed three academic tests.
These were:
(1) UH-1 Aircraft Systems Test (40 item).
(2) Aviation Knowledge Test (50 item).
(3) Dead Rekoning Navigation and Tactical Instruments Test (40 item).
These tests were created for this program by ARI IPs and other staff and covered basic AAPART topics.
There were two versions of each test, but shortage of time precluded their being matched on anything other than face validity. Half of the Reservists completed one version in the Pre-test, the other half completed the other version. The original versions'of these tests were open-ended, whereas those given to later groups were converted to a multiple-choice forinat ready for exportation to the field. All tests were closed book; there was no time liipit for their completion. Scores were given to each Reservist as soon as his tests were marked.
d. Overall Des' of the TraýniE? 1, e s J,ýn aiLd E-,ýalLiation Pro m.
The following -_ d_
Braý factors Tetermined the design of the training and evaluation program:
(1) Information obtained from the pilot study.
(2) The requirement to obtain diagnostic 4nformation at the beginning and end of a Reservist's tour (i.e., to provide a measure of how far his skills and knowledge had decayed during his time away from flying and how much they had recovered during (re)trainiýig).
(3) The financial (and probably, fatigue) constraint limiting each Reservist to one flight a day.
(4) The need for all training materials to be exportable.
(5) The requirement to cover the tasks listed in the ATM.
(6) The priority set by FORSCOM of day, night, NOE, tactical instruments and full instrumeuts.
It should be noted here that the flying houis had to be devoted almost exclusively to daytime contact flight and so very little night or NOE training was attempted. However, the SFTS was available and so some basic instrument and tactical instrument training was accomplished.
(7) The Reservists were available for varying tour lengths and so proceeded through the program for as many days as they could spare, taking the final diagnostic tests as near the end as possible.
The program evolved through a series of iterations and, as reported earlier, major changes were made after the first four subjects had been trained.
After that, only small modifications were made. The timetable and lesson outline from the final iteration of the program appears in Appendix E.
e.
Procedure.
On completion of administrative in-processing procedures, each Reservist was briefed on the Program and exhorted to study intensively and strive to pass a checkride before the completion of his tour.
Motivation was almost entirely self-generated or a function of IP encouragement, although the last group of Reservists was given a certificate for successful completion of the checkride.
The Reservist completed a short questionnaire in which information from RCPAC about his previous flight history and intervening civilian activities was confirmed. Any discrepancies were discussed. The evaluation and training program then proceeded according to the timetable.
Each Reservist was allocated to an IP.
When the constraints of IP availability and rank had been met, the allocation decision was made on the basis of the more experienced IPs taking the Reservists who had been away from flying for the longest time.
Classroom instruction was divided between the IPs according to their special skills.
One lecture was carried out by a psychologist from ARI.
On completion of the project, each Reservist and IP was debriefed on his experience.
In an effort to provide comparative data, the academic tests were given to 28 members of the Warrant Officers' Advanced Course at USAAVNC.
Most of these officers had just come from aviation assignments in the field and were considered to be representative of current) experienced military .aviators. Their total flight time (cf Reservists 1292) averaged 1740 hours (range 800-3600 hours) with an average Time in Service of 8.4 years (range 5-14 years).
Each Reservist agreed to return for further testing at a later date. Some have already done so and will be tested again after an even longer time interval, some have yet to be retested, and some are no longer available (see Results and Analysis Section, Para j).
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS a.
Data Base. The data from three Reservists are not included in the analysis.
For two of them, there were administrative difficulties surrounding their final checkride and, for the third, it transpired that he had recently carried out considerable civilian helicopter flying.
Thus, unless otherwise stated, a sample size of 17 has been used in the analysis.
b.
Hours Flown.
The average number of hours flown (including checkrides, but excluding flying done on return several months latec) was 20.5 hours (range 13.2 -25.5 hours).
c.
Checkride Scores. The checkride scores are summarized in Table 1 . Administrative factors necessitated checkrides being taken only at the beginning and end of training, rather than when the IP thought that the Reservist was ready.
Therefore, an estimate of the flight training hours required to reach criterion was made from the initial and final checkride scores (assuming linearity between score and flight hours).
If a Reservist failed to reach criterion on his final checkride, the hours to reach criterion were obtained by extrapolation.
A summary of the data appear!; in Table 2 . The estimated and actual hours required are shown in Table 3 .
(N.B. The figures are lower than those shown in Table 2 as the time for the initial checkride has been subtracted.) Table 3 Estimated versus Actual Further hours Required Of the others, two have joined the Active Army or National Guard, one has become a civilian flying instructor, one is unavailable for further study, and five are scheduled to return at a later date.
The return schedule, which was determined by the Reservists' availability, was:
Average interval before return 107 days Range 85-147 days Each Reservist took a checkride on the morning of his return. These scores, the final checkride score for these Reservists, and the changes are shown in Table 4 and Figure 5 . The three academic tests were originally produced in an open-ended format, but were later converted to a multiple-choice one ready for exporation to the field.
The two versions are best considered separately. Twelve
Reservists completed the open-ended version at a ten-day interval, whilst five completed the multiple-choice version at a seventeen-day interval.
Half the Control Group (Warrant Officer Advanced Class) were given the open-ended version and half the multiple-choice one. The results from all these tests are summarized in Tables 5 and 6 . Reservists and IPs were de-briefed in separate groups. Many of the points raised concerned minor administrative matters within ARI or were suggested improvements to the Program which have already been effected. Therefore, only major comments regarding training are reported.
Also included is a summary of the comments made on the gradeslips (R4057-2) by the Evaluators and IPs.
Evaluators and IPs' Comments 1. Overall, the Reservists' motivation appeared to be excellent, although some were reluctant to carry out much private study.
2.
The main (and expected) deficiencies shown by a Reservist who had not flown for some time were a lack of control touch, slow cross-check, poor cockpit procedures, difficulty with the "autorotation with turn" and "hydraulics off" emergency maneuvers, and occasional under-confidence.
3.
Several Reservists were using procedures appropriate to the last time they flew regularly (in Vietman), but which were at variance with School policy.
A prime example was a much faster approach and takeoff then is now taught at USAAVNC.
4.
Crowded stagefields and some lengthy transit flights necessitated less than optimum use of in-flight training time.
Reservists' Comments 1. Cockpit and emergency procedures were hard to recover; more static cockpit training was suggested as a remedy.
2.
Over-controlling was a problem on the first few flights.
3.
Many of the Reservists noted that the Army and certain flight procedures had changed considerably since they had left flying, and that they were often involved in a learning, rather than a relearning, situation.
4.
The seminar format was a popular teaching technique. More instruction on FM homing and map reading were requested.
6.
In general, Reservists were very supportive of the Program, and opined that it was both effective 'and enjoyable.
One complaint made by several Reservists was that the intensity of instruction was far greater than that to which they were accustomed in their civilian occupation; they felt that it took some time before they adapted to the pace and, consequently, did not benefit optimally from the early training days.
DISCUSSION
The three stated objectives of this part of the program, namely to determine the training required to bring a Reservist to criterion, to establish the influence of major variables and to produce a viable training and evaluation program,have been met.
However, successful attainment of the longer-term objectives of the total program: to predict accurately the training required by any Reservist and to produce an effective training program for use wherever Reservists are trained, cannot yet be judged.
Both the prediction algorithm and the training program are still being refined and integrated with data from the field; judgment as to their effectiveness must await a much larger data base.
Meanwhile, these preliminary findings have in turn been influeiced by both the longer-term objectives and administrative constraints.
Thus, the requirement to improve the training program on the basis of experience meant that it was not held constant during the experiment.
Similarly, the deademic tests were converted during the program to a form more suitable for export, checkrides wert scheduled on a pre-arranged time rather than a readiness basis and Reservists were selected for the program according to their availability, rather than in carefully matched groups of high/low experience/years away, etc.
The criterion established by FORSCOM for this phase of training was success on an AAPART contact check~ide, with a training priority of day, night, NOE, tactical instruments, and full instruments.
In the limited time available, it was necessary to devote almost all the flying hours to reaching the AAPART criterion, and so the Reservists received only brief exposure to modes other than daytime contact flying.
However, the availability of the SFTS meant that basic instrument and tactical instrument flying could, and did, receive more attention than either night or NOE work.
The measuring instrument used to determine whether the criterion had been reached was the best available: the judgment of DES SIPs. One caveat that must be noted is that the experience of the majority of these evaluators was with aviators who were at, or above, the criterion level and that they had relativelb little experience with those who were way below this level. 11owever, it must b4 noted that, even when working at this level, their estimates of the further hours required were good and borne out by subsequent events.
Administrative factors meankc that checkrides were conducted at set times and not when it was thought that a Reservist was up to criterion.
Thus, the determination of the hours required to bring a Reservist to criterion was an extrapolation in which a linear relationship between hours and score was assumed, Such a measure should obviously be treated cautiously, but does provide a working figure which can be used until refined by further information. The distribution of the scores suggests that, for some purposes, the median may be a more useful descriptor than the mean.
From the literature it was expected that total military flight experience and years away from flying would be major determinants of the flight training hours necessary to reach criterion.
(Prophet, op cit., Schendel et al, op cit.) However, the experiment was not designed to maximize the spread of these variables, but rather Reservists were allocated to ARI as they were available. In addition, total military flight hours is only one of several measures of experience that might have been used; e.g., fixed wing flying might have been excluded or early civilian flying included.
Even so, both variables were shown to have important effects.
The chart combining both variables (Figure 4) , with its assumptions about linearity and non-interactioi, is undoubtedly greatly over-simplified and must be refined by further work.
But even at this stage it may be useful; for if a unit in the field could say in advance that it would not be able to provide a Reservist with the hours predicted for him, a decision could be made to postpone his tour or to re-allocate him to another unit.
Other variables, such as whether or not the Reservist had been a schooltrained IP, the nature of his intervening activities, and the rate of change of Army aviation since he left flying, may well prove to have a considerable effect on his level of perfcrmance and subsequent learning rate.
Data from a larger population of IRR aviators (Allnutt, op cit.) show that these 17 Reservists had lower total flight hours than the general population, though they had been away from flying for about the same length of time. Thus, the average hours to reach criterion for the whole IRR population (UH-l) may be slightly lower than the 13.3 hours predicted in this paper.
On the other hand, the Reservists trained in this experiment were in the aircraft while their partner was being trained and so may have benefited from incidental learning, thus making the 13.3 hour figure a little optimistic.
One very important piece of information which will be needed to determine f •.
refresher flying schedules is the extent to which relearned skills are maintained. The return of the Reservists after a 3-5 month interval indicated that there was some decay of both skills and procedures and that the returning level was, as would be expected, related to the level obtained in the final checkride. It is planned that further experimentation should be conducted to investigate returning level and speed of subsequent recovery of skill and knowledge over a series of time intervals.
One f. 'r which may have influenced the present data is that several Reservists encountered marginal weather conditions (considerable turbulence) on their return checkride, while their final checkride had been carried out in good weather conditions. This may have magnified the drop in performance.
The Academic Tests were constructed hastily, and without adequate validation or matching, to provide an indication of a returning aviator's knowledge and learning ability. Results showed that the initial level was low, but that an intensive training program (but one which did not necessarily teach the tests) could boost this to an acceptable level in about nine-days and also enable the Reservists to pass the oral part of the checkride. This training was partly to revive dormant knowledge and partly to impart new knowledge about systems that had changed during the time that the Reservists had been away from flying.
Apart from a certificate issued to some of the Reservists who trained later in the program, the performance of both the Reservists and the Control Group was motivated by nothing more than personal satisfaction, encouragement from the IPs, and perhaps intra-group competition.
In the de-briefs, the Reservists reported that they had enjoyed the program and the IPs opined that the Reservists' motivation had been good.
Thus, there is no reason to suppose that offering incentives, such as extra money or retirement points for passing the checkride (even if such a scheme was possible), would have altered the level of performance significantly.
Apart from a plethora of administrative details,which iave been taken up with the relevant authorities, the main comments made about the program to recover flying skills were ones which were anticipated.
Nevertheless, in an important field where so little evidence is available, they may bear repeating. Thus the main deficiencies of a returning aviator were a slow cross-check, inadequate cockpit and emergency procedures, initial over-controlling, difficulty with autorotations with turn and anti-torque system fialures, occasional under-confidence, and maneuvers conducted too fast in an adequate (for Vietnam), but non school-approved manner.
CONCLUSIONS
1. An average of just over 13 flight traininL hours was required to bring a representative sample of IRR UH-l aviators up to an AAPART contact che.kride standards.
2.
The hours required correlated negatively with total military flight hours and positively with years away from flying.
3.
The skills which had deteriorated most were the expected ones of a slow cross-check, inadequate cockpit and emergency procedures, and certain emergency maneuvers.
Many maneuvers were conducted too fast in an adequate (for Vietnam), but non school-approved manner.
4.
Initially, academic knowledge was poor, but was brought up to the level of an Active Army control group after about nine days of intensive training.
5.
There was some loss of flying skills and knowledge on re-testing 3-5 months later, but more data are' required before any firm predictions can be made.
6.
An intensive, practical and exportable training and evaluation program was produced and has, subsequently, been sent to units in the field.
An assessment of its effectiveness must await the acquisition of a large data base.
INTRODUCTION
In coordination discussions of the overall 1RR aviator investigation with FORSCOM representatives, a separate area of concern arose: in the near-term future, the Army is faced with a projected critical shortfall of attack-rated aviators.
The suggestion was put forth that, as a possible "quick fix" for this shortfall, the feasiLility of training IRR UH-i aviators to function as AH-i co-pilot/gunners be investigated.
The basis for the suggestion is outlined below.
The Army's primary attack platform, the AH-i helicopter, is manned by a crew of two attack-rated aviators:
the pilot (P) and the co-pilot/gunner (GP/G).
Primary aircraft controls are in the P's cockpit, and primary weapons controls are in the CP/G's cockpit.
Although the aircraft may be flown from the CP/G position, during most attack profiles the aircraft is flown by the P and the weapons systems operated by the CP/G.
Thus it is the case that in -most instances, the CP/G, an attack-rated aviator is not required to use flying skills and could, in fact, possibly be replaced by a "generic" rotary-"wing aviator trained in thu A1-i gunnery tasks.
The IRR UH-I aviator is a logical candidate for this "generic" aviator. He has the basic helicopter skills which should allow him to perform rudimentary flit c tasks from the CP/G position, and he is available for gunnery training.
But training is an expensive operation, not only in terms of direct cost, but also in terms of diversion of personnel and equipment at the unit level.
So, for training lREE aviators as All-1 CP/Gs, it was decided to use the AR-I flight and weapons systems simulator (AIIiFS) located at USAAVNC. The AIIFS Operational Test II results (Bridgers, Bickley, Maxwell, 1980) indicate the simulator to be almost completely effective in training gunnery skills, and its proposed basis of issue plan will eventually make it available for training at the unit level.
It was realized early on that the proposed investigation would be accomnplished under several limitations.
The AHlFS would be available on a limited basis due to its high utilization rate in the on-going USAAVNC AH-I transition course.
The IRR students themselves would be available on a limited basis since their primary objective at Fort Rucker was to be re-qualified in the UH-l. There was only vague guidance as to the tasks to be trained and no extant curriculum tailored to the IRE aviator's peculiar training situation.
Finally, the same cost considerations that prohibited training in the AI1-I aircraft also prohibited training validation in the aircraft; any validation of training effectiveness would perforce be accomplished in the AHIFS.
Within these general limitations, the feasibility demonstration was carried out as described below. METHOD a.
Curriculum Development
It was found that the availability of the AH1FS would aliow, at most, training for 3 students per group of IRR aviators for a maximum of 4 hours apiece.
Under this overall restriction the following curriculum was devised.
(1) Contact flight. It is envisioned that the CP/G would be called upon to use his flight skilIs only in ca!;e of incapacitation of the P.
In such a situation, the CP/G's task would be primarily either to land immediately or to return immediately to base.
In either case, the flight tasks most likely required would be (1) hover flight, (2) landing from a hover, (3) terrain flight, and (4) terrain flight approach. These were the contact maneuvers chosen to be taught to the IRR aviators in the AH1FS.
(2) Gunnery training. It was decided that CP/G weapons delivery training would be given in all gunnery systems except the 2.75" rockets, which are controlled from the P's position.
This training covered the turret-mounted 7.62n" "minigun," the 40mm automatic grenade launcher, the 20mm cannon and the airborne TOW anti-tank missile.
All turret firing was done from a hover against stationary targets.
TOW training was conducted against stationary and moving targets at intermediate ranges (2000-2800m) .
The gunnery POI was continually revised as training proceeded and appears in its final form in the Appendix.
b. Sub §jects
A total of 8 IRR aviators participated: 2 from the pilot study, 3 from the next group, and 3 from the one after.
All had just completed UH-I requalification.
One had had previous experience with the AH-I as a maintenance officer.
The instructor pilot (IP), who was both an AU-i flight instructor and airborne TOW instructor, was assigned from the Scout/Attack Branch of the Hanchey Division of the Department of Flight Training of the USAAVNC Directorate of Training.
c. Procedure
The aviators received approximately 5 hours academic instruction in gunnery, 4 hours gunnery system training in the AH1FS, and 2.4 hours rudimentary AHIFS flight training.
Simulator training was done in individual periods of 1.5 hours or less.
The last AH1FS training period was a check "flight" in which the weapons systems were fired for score.
.
As indicated above, because of lack of access to AH-I aircraft, it was not possible to validate the AHIFS's effectiveness as a training device for IRR aviators.
The IP reported that all but one aviator experienced difficulty in controlling the AIIIFS in maneuvers near the ground (hover flight and landing from a hover).
The IP and students were of the opinion that the difficulties arose more from the AHIFS CP/G's restricted field of view (360 vertical x 480. horizontal) than from student flight deficiencies.
All were of the opinion that, after AHIFS training, they could learn the restricted set of maneuvers examined here in the aircraft in less than 2 hours flight time.
b. Gunnery
The results of the gunnery check-rides are shown in Figure Contact Flight
From the results of thisademonstration, it appears that the AHIFS in training IRR CP/Gs flight skills can be most effectively employed in training those tasks that do not depend heavily on peripheral visual cues. These would include straight and level, low-level, and contour flight; climbs and descents; acceleration and deceleration; and initiating straight-in approaches. Tasks requiring hovering or turns (such as hover flight or traffic patterns) would most likely be more effectively t0ained in the AH-l aircraft.
The gunnery results in Figure A -i indicate that after about 45 minutes training, the IRR aviator can attain in the AHIFS a hit probability (p(H)) in excess of 50%.
Results obtained in the OT II of the AH1FS (Bridgers, et al, op cit) indicate that the gunnery skills learned in the simulator transfer almost directly to the aircraft.
Thus, although the IRR aviators' gunnery proficiency was not aircraft-validated, it is most probable that their p(H) in the aircraft after 45 minutes AHIFS training would also be in excess of 50%.
c.
General Considerations
It appears that IRR aviators can be trained as CP/Gs using the AHIFS. However, it should be kept in mind that the effectiveness of the simulator remains conjectural; this demonstration involved only 8 aviators and none of the training was validated in the aircraft. This is an obvious next step for the IRR re-training study. 
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There are additional considerations in training; if IRR aviators are to be trained as CP/Gs, the following must also be addressed:
Only individual gunnery and hover fire were addressed.
As a minimum, running fire and crew gunnery should also be addressed.
(2) Cockpit teamwork. Operationally, P and CP/G function as a unit, especially in the area of target acquisition and hand-off.
It is essential to the attack mission that the aircrew be an integrated functional team. Overall, it can be seen that, although the basic skills of placing ordnance on target are easily trainable, there is a great deal of follow-on training that must be accomplished by the IRR aviator's receiving unit if he is to be trained as a functional CP/G.
A research plan for an investigation of other aspects of the CP/G task has already been submitted to the appropriate authorities. CONCLUSIONS 1. Data from the initial investigation support the feasibility and practicality of converting an IRR UH-i aviator into the A11-1 CP/G role.
2.
Further, and wider-ranging, data on all aspects of the CP/G's task are required together with validation of these findings in the aircraft.
A largerscale investigation to obtain these data has been proposed. 3 -Rough or slow but can muddle through to a satisfactory outcome.
4 -Performs at an acceptable level -not unsafe, but room for iuprovcment.
5
-Proficient -unquestionably safe, no improvement needed. 
